Will Zelenskyy and Putin meet next in Ukraine before 2027?

Even Zelenskyy Isn't Asking for Ukraine — He's Naming Switzerland and Turkey Himself The strongest signal against a Ukraine-hosted summit isn't Putin's reluctance — it's that Zelenskyy, the party who'd actually benefit most from meeting on home soil, has explicitly ruled it out himself, proposing third-country venues instead. Zelenskyy has been the more publicly proactive party here, repeatedly calling for direct talks and even publishing an open letter proposing a full ceasefire and asking Putin to set a date. But his own stated venue preference names neutral ground — Switzerland, Turkey, or a Middle Eastern state — explicitly avoiding both Russia and Ukraine, and framing the actual logistics as something for Trump or other mediators to arrange. That's a leader signaling he wants the meeting to happen, just not on terms that would require Putin to enter contested or Ukrainian-controlled territory. Putin's own position compounds the case against Kyiv as a venue: he's declined the invitation outright for now, saying there's no point meeting while stating military operations continue, but has separately floated Moscow as an open offer — telling Zelenskyy he's welcome "any time." That's a structural asymmetry markets are pricing correctly: Russia's president has shown willingness to discuss meeting on his own turf or neutral ground, never on Ukrainian soil his forces are actively contesting. The mechanism ruling out Ukraine specifically is straightforward political and security logic: no sitting Russian president would accept the risk and symbolism of entering a country his military is currently attacking, and Ukraine's own security apparatus would face enormous complications hosting Putin under active wartime conditions. Every incentive for both leaders points toward neutral ground or no meeting at all, which is exactly why the bulk of probability mass sits on no bilateral summit happening before the deadline. The counterargument is that battlefield conditions or diplomatic breakthroughs can shift positions faster than current posturing suggests, and a ceasefire agreement reaching advanced stages could create pressure for a symbolic gesture-laden summit that neither side currently anticipates. If a Ukraine-hosted summit somehow did occur, it would represent an extraordinary diplomatic and security event, likely signaling either a near-complete ceasefire already in effect or a dramatic shift in Russia's negotiating posture. Bottom line: watch for any formal ceasefire framework advancing toward implementation — real movement there, not further venue debate, is what would be needed to meaningfully shift probability away from "no meeting" and toward any specific location, Ukraine included.