Will Masoud Pezeshkian be head of state in Iran end of 2026?

Here's the paradox at the center of this contract: Pezeshkian is already Iran's president. He won an election. He holds the title. And the market is pricing him at roughly the same odds as exiled opposition figures with no institutional presence inside the country. That tells you everything about what the Iranian presidency actually means. Well, it could... The resolution criteria requires de facto governing authority — effective control of the armed forces and core state institutions. Pezeshkian has neither. The Iranian presidency is structurally subordinate to the Supreme Leader, and under Mojtaba Khamenei's consolidation that subordination has tightened rather than loosened. The IRGC answers to the Supreme Leader. The judiciary answers to the Supreme Leader. The bodies that actually govern Iran answer to the Supreme Leader. Pezeshkian campaigned as a reformist and has governed as a man navigating severe institutional constraints. Resignation rumors have circulated repeatedly — denied, but persistent enough to reflect genuine tension between his stated positions and what the system allows him to do. For his contract to resolve YES, the Islamic Republic's power structure would need to invert entirely — the elected presidency ascending above the clerical and military apparatus that has explicitly subordinated it for 45 years. That's not reform. That's a different revolution. The market is essentially pricing the probability that Iran becomes a different kind of state before December 31. Mojtaba Khamenei's 79% dominance in the same market tells you what traders think actually happens instead. Bottom line: Pezeshkian holding the title of president and Pezeshkian holding de facto power are two completely different outcomes. This contract prices the latter. That's why it sits where it does.