Will Iran close the Strait of Hormuz before 2027?

Iran just proved it can close the Strait of Hormuz. That demonstration — sustained disruption for months during the 2026 war — is the single most important data point for this contract, and it fundamentally changes the analytical framework compared to prior Hormuz closure markets where capability was the open question. Capability is no longer the question. U.S. intelligence now assesses Iran can block the strait "at will." Revolutionary Guards rhetoric during the crisis explicitly tied closure to U.S. strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure. The hardware, the doctrine, and the demonstrated willingness are all confirmed. The question this contract is actually pricing is frequency and incentive structure — how many times over the remaining months of 2026 does the diplomatic and military environment deteriorate to the point where Tehran judges full closure worth the cost? The June 18 MoU creates the strongest available incentive against re-closure. Sanctions relief, asset unfreezing, and reconstruction financing all require the strait to stay open. Iran's own oil exports depend on Hormuz. A country that just secured significant economic concessions through a diplomatic agreement has strong material reasons to honor the ceasefire framework rather than immediately triggering its collapse. The re-closure trigger scenarios are specific rather than generic. A snap reimposition of sweeping U.S. energy sanctions would remove the economic incentive against closure. A breakdown of the 60-day nuclear negotiating window — particularly if the U.S. is perceived as negotiating in bad faith — would activate the IRGC's stated threat doctrine. A major Israeli strike on Iranian territory during the fragile ceasefire period could produce an Iranian response that includes Hormuz as a pressure point regardless of the MoU framework. The base case is that the MoU's economic incentives hold and Hormuz remains open — at constrained volumes while mines are cleared and insurance markets normalize — through 2026. The tail is that one of those specific trigger scenarios materializes before the framework stabilizes into something durable. Bottom line: This contract is relapse risk pricing, not imminent closure risk. Watch the 60-day nuclear negotiating window and whether it extends by mutual consent or collapses — that outcome is the single most important variable determining whether the MoU's incentive structure holds or breaks down in ways that put Hormuz back at risk.