Will China invade Taiwan by December 31, 2027?

This is the contract where the Taiwan invasion thesis gets analytically serious. This extended window captures what's known as the "Davidson window" — the period by which PLA capabilities are assessed to reach invasion-readiness — and the market pricing reflects that shift from near-impossible to genuinely uncertain. The critical intelligence you have to pay attention to is this: 2027 is a readiness milestone, not a scheduled attack date. For now... The U.S. Annual Threat Assessment and the broader expert consensus hold that Beijing has no fixed invasion plan, even as PLA capabilities and coercive pressure continue expanding. A majority of China specialists reject the locked-in 2027 narrative while acknowledging that miscalculation risk rises as capabilities mature and gray-zone activity intensifies. But the writing of this is 2026... I can imagine this could change... That distinction — capability versus intent — is exactly what the probability curve across the contract family is pricing. The step-up from the shorter-dated lines to this contract is too large to explain by time alone. It reflects a genuine analytical judgment that the 2027 window introduces qualitatively different risk, not just more runway. The most realistic YES path remains miscalculation rather than planned offensive — a coercive action that escalates beyond its intended parameters during a period of heightened military activity. The resolution criteria still require an offensive intended to establish territorial control, which is a high bar, but a two-year window gives more surface area for the kind of crisis dynamics that can cross it unintentionally.